19 research outputs found

    Assessment of reward-related brain function after a single-dose of oxytocin in autism: A randomized controlled trial

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    Background Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by difficulties in social communication and interaction, which have been related to atypical neural processing of rewards, especially in the social domain. Since intranasal oxytocin has been shown to modulate activation of the brain’s reward circuit, oxytocin might ameliorate the processing of social rewards in ASD and thus improve social difficulties. Methods In this randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, crossover fMRI study, we examined effects of a 24 IU dose of intranasal oxytocin on reward-related brain function in 37 men with ASD without intellectual impairment and 37 age- and IQ-matched control participants. Participants performed an incentive delay task that allows the investigation of neural activity associated with the anticipation and receipt of monetary and social rewards. Results Non-significant tests suggested that oxytocin did not influence neural processes related to the anticipation of social or monetary rewards in either group. Complementary Bayesian analyses indicated moderate evidence for a null model, relative to an alternative model. Our results are inconclusive regarding possible oxytocin effects on amygdala responsiveness to social rewards during reward consumption. There were no significant differences in reward-related brain function between the two groups under placebo. Conclusions Our results do not support the hypothesis that intranasal oxytocin generally enhances activation of reward-related neural circuits in men with and without ASD

    The social emotion of embarrassment: Modulations of neural circuits in response to own and others’ social predicaments

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    Embarrassment is a so called social emotion arising during the interaction with our surrounding social world. It is present in various situations in our daily lives and holds a regulative function telling us how to perform according to prevalent norms and moral values. Due to the human ability to infer and share others' emotions, thoughts or intentions embarrassment is often also experienced vicariously for others. This thesis is focused on the neural and physiological correlates of embarrassment and its vicarious form. The main focus thereby lies on treating both as social phenomena and the implementation and development of social paradigms. The results show that during embarrassment and its vicarious form two neural networks are involved, the mentalizing network, mapping the component of thinking about the others’ evaluations, and a network comprising the anterior insula and the anterior cingulate cortex, mapping the component of affective arousal. Both networks interacted with ventral aspects of the anterior insula and the amygdala, areas closely linked to emotion processing, during the first-hand experience of embarrassment. Further, the studies could show that social closeness affected processing of vicarious embarrassment and increased interoceptive sharing of another’s embarrassment, while individuals with a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder show deficient processing of vicarious embarrassment. Increased levels of trait social anxiety were associated with increased activations of the mentalizing network, corroborating the assumption of heightened attention to social cues and negative thoughts about others’ evaluations in social anxiety disorder

    Mentalizing and the Role of the Posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus in Sharing Others' Embarrassment

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    The experience of embarrassment provides a highly salient cue for the human moral apparatus. Interestingly, people also experience embarrassment on behalf of others' inappropriate conditions. The perceiver's embarrassment often lacks an equivalent expression of embarrassment in the social counterpart. The present study examines this phenomenon and distinguishes neural circuits involved in embarrassment with and embarrassment for another person's mishaps. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we show that the embarrassment on behalf of others engages the temporal pole and the medial prefrontal cortex, central structures of the mentalizing network, together with the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex. In contrast, sharing others' embarrassment additionally stimulated the posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS), which exhibited increased functional integration with inferior parietal and insular cortex areas. These findings characterize common neural circuits involved in the embodied representation of embarrassment and further unravel the unique role of the posterior STS in sharing others' affective state

    Mentalizing and the Role of the Posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus in Sharing Others' Embarrassment

    No full text
    The experience of embarrassment provides a highly salient cue for the human moral apparatus. Interestingly, people also experience embarrassment on behalf of others' inappropriate conditions. The perceiver's embarrassment often lacks an equivalent expression of embarrassment in the social counterpart. The present study examines this phenomenon and distinguishes neural circuits involved in embarrassment with and embarrassment for another person's mishaps. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we show that the embarrassment on behalf of others engages the temporal pole and the medial prefrontal cortex, central structures of the mentalizing network, together with the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex. In contrast, sharing others' embarrassment additionally stimulated the posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS), which exhibited increased functional integration with inferior parietal and insular cortex areas. These findings characterize common neural circuits involved in the embodied representation of embarrassment and further unravel the unique role of the posterior STS in sharing others' affective state

    Mindfulness meditation regulates anterior insula activity during empathy for social pain

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    Mindfulness has been shown to reduce stress, promote health, and well-being, as well as to increase compassionate behavior toward others. It reduces distress to one's own painful experiences, going along with altered neural responses, by enhancing self-regulatory processes and decreasing emotional reactivity. In order to investigate if mindfulness similarly reduces distress and neural activations associated with empathy for others' socially painful experiences, which might in the following more strongly motivate prosocial behavior, the present study compared trait, and state effects of long-term mindfulness meditation (LTM) practice. To do so we acquired behavioral data and neural activity measures using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during an empathy for social pain task while manipulating the meditation state between two groups of LTM practitioners that were matched with a control group. The results show increased activations of the anterior insula (AI) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) as well as the medial prefrontal cortex and temporal pole when sharing others' social suffering, both in LTM practitioners and controls. However, in LTM practitioners, who practiced mindfulness meditation just prior to observing others' social pain, left AI activation was lower and the strength of AI activation following the mindfulness meditation was negatively associated with trait compassion in LTM practitioners. The findings suggest that current mindfulness meditation could provide an adaptive mechanism in coping with distress due to the empathic sharing of others' suffering, thereby possibly enabling compassionate behavior
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